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IS THE TEMPLE COLLAPSING?: MONTEJO V. LOUISIANA AND THE EXTENT OF
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to counsel for a criminal suspect rests on both the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. The Sixth Amendment explicitly provides that "[in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall . . .have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."1 The Fifth Amendment provides that no one "shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself. 2 In Miranda v. Arizona,3 the
Supreme Court opined that custodial interrogation "operates on the individual to
overcome free choice" and prevents the exercise of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.4 Thus, an individual may have an attorney
present during a custodial investigation because of the implications at a later
trial, and the police "must make known to him that he is entitled to a lawyer., 5 In
Miranda, the Court concluded that the Fifth Amendment requires police to give
6an individual advance notice of these rights. If subsequently charged, an
individual can utilize the Sixth Amendment, which provides the right to counsel
during the proceedings.7 Delineating the extent of and relationship between these
protections, however, has proven to be a complex task for courts.
This Note analyzes the impact of the recent case of Montejo v. Louisiana 8 on
this area of criminal procedure and focuses on its ramifications for South
Carolina. Part II discusses the development of the Supreme Court's right-to-
counsel jurisprudence and concludes with a discussion of Montejo. Next, Part III
details South Carolina's case law in this area. Part IV focuses on the implications
of Montejo and argues that the case, among others, represents a movement away
from the core principles that the Court has traditionally protected. Part V
examines Montejo's impact on South Carolina and suggests why and how South
Carolina should avoid reconsidering, and needlessly complicating, its right-to-
counsel jurisprudence.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. Id. amend. V.
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. Id. at 474.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 479. The Court stated the following:
[W]hen an individual is taken into custody . . .[h]e must be warned prior to any
questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that
if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if
he so desires.
Id. at 478-79.
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8. 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009).
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL PROTECTIONS
A. The Fifth Amendment
The debate over the extent of the right-to-counsel protections begins with
Miranda. In Miranda, the Court stated that if an individual requests an attorney,
"the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present."9 But this general
statement did not provide complete guidance for all aspects of custodial police
questioning. In fact, ten years after the decision, again in Arizona, a new
problem arose in Edwards v. Arizona.10 In that case, police arrested a suspect,
Edwards, and interviewed him for a time before he requested an attorney." The
police returned the next morning, initiated talks with Edwards, and informed him
that "he had" to talk to the officers even though he had not yet spoken with an
attorney as he had requested.1 2 Edwards then confessed, but he later moved to
suppress the confession, arguing that the police violated Miranda when they
initiated interrogation after he invoked his right to counsel. 3 The Supreme Court
held that the police's conduct "violated [Edwards's] rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments as construed in Miranda.,14 The Court clarified
Miranda and held "that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his
desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him,
unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police.
15
In Edwards, the dispositive issue was whether Edwards validly waived his
Fifth Amendment right.16 A valid waiver must be voluntary and must "constitute
a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege. 17 The Court held that "when an accused has invoked his right to have
counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot
be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated
custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. 18 Because
Edwards made his statements to the police after requesting counsel and because
the police initiated the contact, he did not validly waive his right to counsel, and
the statement was inadmissible.1 9
9. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
10. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
11. Seeid.at478-79.
12. See id. at 479 (internal quotation marks omitted). This time, two detectives interrogated
Edwards, not the officer who had interrogated him the day before. See id.
13. See id.
14. Id. at 480.
15. Id. at 484-85.
16. See id. at 482.
17. Id. (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
18. Id. at 484 (emphasis added).
19. See id. at 487.
[VOL. 61 : 867
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. . .20In Minnick v. Mississippi the Supreme Court offered further clarification of
the rule announced in Edwards. In that case, the police arrested a suspect,
Minnick, who then requested a lawyer.21 Minnick consulted with his lawyer on
several occasions before police initiated further interrogation. During this
subsequent interrogation, held outside the presence of his attorney, Minnick
confessed.23 Minnick never signed a rights waiver form even though the police
offered him one.24 Minnick was convicted of murder, but he argued that use of
his confession violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 25 The
Mississippi Supreme Court determined that once a suspect confers with counsel,
it terminates the protections in Edwards.26 The Supreme Court disagreed and
noted that cases since Edwards have emphasized the necessity of counsel's
presence.27 The Court further clarified the issue by holding that "when counsel is
requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not reinitiate interrogation
without counsel present, whether or not the accused has consulted with his
attorney. 28 The Court acknowledged that to hold otherwise could lead to a
confusing situation in which the protections of Edwards passed "in and out of29 30
existence."29 Other cases have clarified the scope of Edwards, the standard for
its invocation,3 1 the meaning of custody,32 and the meaning of interrogation.33
B. The Sixth Amendment
Once the judicial process begins, the Sixth Amendment protections apply.
The one-time suspect, now a defendant, has the right to have counsel present at
all "critical" stages of the criminal proceedings. Central, of course, to this
protection is the right to counsel during trial.35 Such critical stages also include
20. 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
21. See id. at 148-49.
22. See id. at 149.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 148-49.
25. See id. at 149.
26. See id. at 151.
27. See id. at 152-53.
28. Id. at 153.
29. Id. at 154.
30. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682 (1988) (holding that Edwards's protections
extend to all crimes, not just the one for which the suspect has been arrested or detained).
31. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (holding that an invocation must be
made "sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the
statement to be a request for an attorney").
32. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984) (holding that a traffic stop did
not constitute custody).
33. See Rhode Island v. innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) (holding that "express
questioning or its functional equivalent" constitutes interrogation).
34. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
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situations where, as at trial, the defendant is "'confronted with both the
intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor'" 36 _such as
interrogation. 37 The Court has held that if police officers interrogate a defendant
without counsel present and obtain incriminating statements, then they violate
38the Sixth Amendment. A defendant, however, may waive this right so long as
the decision to waive is "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent., 39 A defendant
need not have the assistance of counsel in order to waive this right.4 °
In Michigan v. Jackson,41 the Court provided another layer of protection for
defendants. In Jackson, the Court granted certiorari to the Michigan Supreme
Court to review two cases that court had consolidated.4 2 In both cases, police
arrested and questioned a suspect about a particular crime.43 Neither suspect
confessed, and both were subsequently arraigned.44 At their arraignments, both
suspects requested the appointment of counsel.45 But before they consulted with
counsel, the police, in both cases, initiated another round of interrogations with
46 47the defendants. This time, both defendants confessed. Additionally, both
suspects signed forms waiving their respective rights to counsel during these
postarraignment custodial interrogations.
At first blush, these facts would appear to fall squarely within the rule
established in Edwards49 and render the confession invalid. Edwards, however,
rested upon the Fifth Amendment, and these cases fell within the ambit of the
Sixth Amendment because the arraignments signaled the beginning of the
judicial process. 50 The Michigan Supreme Court held that both statements should
have been suppressed and reasoned that the Edwards rule "applie[d] by
analogy. 5 1 The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed.52 The Court noted
that the right to counsel in this case rested on two sources: the Fifth and Sixth
36. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188-89 (1984) (quoting Ash, 413 U.S. at 309).
37. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment protections applied where the defendant had been arraigned).
38. See Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 523 (2004) (citing Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206).
39. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 348-49 (1990) (citing Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S.
285, 292 & n.4 (1988); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977)).
40. See id. at 352.
41. 475 U.S. 625 (1986), overruled by Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009).
42. See id. at 628-29.





48. See id. at 631.
49. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
50. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984) (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 688-89 (1972)).
51. People v. Bladel, 365 N.W.2d 56, 68-69 (Mich. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Michigan v.
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
52. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 629.
[VOL. 6 1: 867
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Amendments. 3 In responding to the prosecution's argument that this differing
legal basis should lead to a different result in these cases than it did in Edwards,
the Court reasoned that "a postarraignment interrogation requires at least as
much protection as the Fifth Amendment right to counsel at any custodial
interrogation.,
54
The Court determined that the dispositive question was whether the
defendants had validly waived the right to counsel prior to the confessions.55 The
Court, as it did in Edwards, held that a defendant could not validly waive his
56right to counsel after invoking it where the police initiated the questioning. The
assertion of the right to counsel, the Court reasoned, "is no less significant," nor
is the "need for additional safeguards no less clear" in the Sixth Amendment
57context. The Court expressly stated that the Sixth Amendment did not require a
58different result than Edwards commanded under the Fifth Amendment. Even a
written waiver would be "insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogations
after the request for counsel. 59 Moreover, the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment mandates that "we impute the State's knowledge from one state
actor to another." 60 Thus, the police could not claim to have been uninformed of
a defendant's assertion of his rights.61 The Court ultimately held that "if police
initiate interrogation after a defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar
proceeding, of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel
for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.,
62
Then-Justice Rehnquist authored a strong dissent in Jackson.6 3 Justice
Rehnquist refused to accept the majority's "neat syllogism" in which it reasoned
64that the Edwards rule made sense in a Sixth Amendment context. He reasoned
that that the "prophylactic rule" in Edwards did not make sense in a Sixth
Amendment context.65 Justice Rehnquist noted that the Court in Edwards "did
not confer a substantive constitutional right"; rather, it "created a protective
66umbrella" that augmented Fifth Amendment protections. Thus, Edwards,
Justice Rehnquist reasoned, merely provided a "second layer of protection" to
53. See id.
54. Id. at 632.
55. Id. at 630.
56. See id. at 635 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981)).
57. Id. at 636.
58. See id. at 635.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 634.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 636.
63. See id. at 637 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 638 (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. Id. (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 644 n.4 (1984)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). But see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000) (holding that Miranda is
constitutionally mandated, not a judicially created prophylactic rule).
2010]
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67the protection Miranda afforded. He noted that the Fifth Amendment provides
no right to counsel; rather, the right to counsel afforded by Miranda protects the
privilege against self-incrimination. One goal of Miranda was to prevent police
from "badgering" suspects and forcing confessions. 69 Justice Rehnquist thus
reduced the issue in Jackson to whether such a prophylactic rule was needed to
70protect the Sixth Amendment right to counsel-and he answered no.
Justice Rehnquist argued that the majority tore the "Edwards rule loose from
its analytical moorings" and that the rule they proffered "makes no sense at all
except when linked to the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled
self-incrimination., 71 He noted that the majority rule requires the defendant to
assert the right to counsel. 72 However, the Sixth Amendment right does not
depend upon whether or not a request has been made.73 As a result, the
majority's rule places a great deal of weight "on the otherwise legally
insignificant request" itself.74 The rule requires the defendant to make "an
explicit request" in order to benefit from its protections.75 Accordingly, Justice
Rehnquist criticized the majority's decision as lacking "a coherent, analytically
sound basis" and concluded that he would not extend the Edwards prophylactic
rule to the Sixth Amendment context.7 6
C. Waivers
An accused may waive any of these rights. Though Edwards established that
when police initiate an interrogation in a custodial setting, a valid waiver cannot
be established, if the defendant initiates the contact, he may waive his rights.
The standard is that any waiver must be not only voluntary but also made
knowingly and intelligently. 79 In Brewer v. Williams," the Court held that the
same standard applied when waiving the right to have an attorney present during
a critical stage of the proceedings under the Sixth Amendment. 81
67. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 639.
68. Id. n.2.
69. See id. at 638 (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. See id. at 639.
71. Id. at 640.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 641.
74. Id. at 642.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
78. Id.
79. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478,
490 n.14 (1964)).
80. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
81. Id. at 404 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 238-40 (1973); United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967)).
[VOL. 61 : 867
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In Patterson v. Illinois,82 the Supreme Court addressed the question of the
extent of the Miranda warning.83 The Court found that the Miranda warning also
"apprised [the defendant] of the nature of his Sixth Amendment rights."84
Accordingly, any waiver of counsel would not only be "a knowing and
intelligent one" but would suffice to waive the right to counsel under both the
85Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Court noted that this would not hold true in
all situations.86 For example, a waiver of the right to counsel where the police
did not inform a suspect that an attorney was trying to contact him is still a valid
waiver in a Fifth Amendment context, but the Court stated that the waiver would
not be valid in the Sixth Amendment context. 87 The reverse, however, is not true:
an invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not invoke that right
as it is understood under the Fifth Amendment.88 This distinction is important
because "[t]he Sixth Amendment right ... is offense specific." 89 Thus, where a
suspect requests counsel at an arraignment for a particular charge, he has
invoked the protection of counsel only for that charge, and confessions regarding
other crimes are not protected.90
D. Montejo v. Louisiana and the Right to Counsel Reconsidered
Justice Rehnquist intimated that the rule announced in Jackson could lead to
difficulty where the defendant did not actually request counsel.91 Montejo v.
Louisiana came to the Supreme Court on just such facts. 92 Police arrested Jesse
Montejo in connection with a robbery and a murder.93 Montejo waived his
Miranda rights, and police proceeded to interrogate him.9 4 Police subsequently
brought Montejo before a court for a preliminary hearing.95 At the hearing, the
court appointed the Office of Indigent Defender to represent Montejo. 9 6 Montejo,however, did not affirmatively demonstrate his desire for counsel.97 Police
82. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
83. See id. at 293-94.
84. Id. at 296.
85. Id.
86. See id. n.9.
87. See id.
88. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991).
89. Id. at 175. Montejo casts some doubt on this line of cases, see discussion infra Part IV.C,
but at least one court has continued to follow these distinctions after Montejo. See Flores v. State,
299 S.W.3d 843, 852-53 (Tex. App. 2009).
90. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177. In McNeil, the suspect had "expressly waived his Miranda
right to counsel." Id.
91. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 642 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), overruled
by Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009).





97. See id. at 2087.
2010]
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returned that same day to further question Montejo, who "wrote an inculpatory
letter of apology. 98 The court later admitted the letter at trial, an admission that
lead to Montejo's conviction and death sentence. 99 At trial, Montejo, citing
Michigan v. Jackson, argued that the letter should not have been admitted, but
the trial court admitted the letter, and the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed. 100
The Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned that the rule in Jackson required an
actual request for counsel. 10 1 Montejo made no such request and, as a result, did
not invoke the protections of Jackson's rule.10 2 Montejo thus forced the Supreme
Court to consider the "continued viability of the rule announced... in Michigan
v. Jackson," which "forb[ade] police to initiate interrogation of a criminal
defendant [after] he has requested counsel at an arraignment or similar
proceeding."
10 3
The Court first analyzed the Louisiana Supreme Court's interpretation of the104
rule announced in Jackson. The Court acknowledged that the rule would work
in states that required the defendant to make an affirmative request for
counsel. 10 5 But where a state's laws require an automatic appointment of
counsel, 106 as in Louisiana, the Louisiana Supreme Court's rule would be much
more difficult to apply. 10 7 Such application would require either an intense
factual analysis to determine if the defendant somehow invoked the right or a
categorical determination that these defendants did not have an opportunity to
invoke the right.10 8 Additionally, Montejo failed to persuade the Court that
Jackson applies automatically once a defendant is represented. 10 9
The Court identified the issue in Montejo as whether a court "must presume"
that a waiver of a defendant's right to counsel after invoking it is invalid. 110 It
recognized that the defendant clearly had the right to counsel after the judicial
process had begun111 and that any waiver of that right must be "voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent." 112 The Court emphasized that these tenets were not at
98. Id. at 2082.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 2082-83 (citing State v. Montejo (Montejo 1), 974 So. 2d 1238, 1261 (La.
2008)).
101. Id. at 2083 (citing Montejo I, 974 So. 2d at 1260-61 & n.68).
102. See id.
103. Id. at 2082 (citation omitted).
104. See id. at 2083.
105. See id. This rule would also function in South Carolina because a suspect typically makes
an affirmative request. See infra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4503(c) (2007) (requiring automatic appointment of
counsel upon finding of indigency).
107. See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2084.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 2085.
110. Id. (citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 630, 633 (1986)).
111. See id. (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1967); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)).
112. Id. (citing Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292 n.4 (1988); Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387, 404 (1977); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
[VOL. 61 : 867
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issue and focused on the "prophylactic" rule announced in Jackson.1 13 It
analyzed Jackson's presumption that any statement, including one accompanied
by a waiver, is presumed invalid.1 14 The Court identified the purpose of the rule
as the prevention of police badgering.11 5 This antibadgering rationale, the Court
argued, explained "Jackson's repeated citations of Edwards."'1 6 In Jackson, the
Court wanted to prevent suspects from invokingytheir rights under Miranda only
to have the police obtain a waiver involuntarily.
The majority also reasoned that, absent an initial invocation, "[n]o reason
exists to assume that a defendant like Montejo . . . would not be perfectly
amenable to speaking with the police without having counsel present."118 The
Edwards and, by implication, Jackson rules prevent police from "badgering
defendants into changing their minds" about their assertion of the right to
counsel. 119 But a defendant who has not yet requested "counsel has not yet made
up his mind in the first instance." 120 Montejo would have had the Court prevent
all questioning, but the Court disagreed. 121 The Court drew on Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Jackson, in which Rehnquist reasoned, without
contradiction from the majority, that the rule did not prohibit all police-initiated
interrogations "'with or without a request for counsel.', 122 Accordingly, it
rejected Montejo's argument.
123
The Court's line of reasoning, however, ran afoul of Jackson and
necessitated a discussion of stare decisis and the retention of the rule announced
in that case. 124 The Court could not simply eliminate the invocation requirement
of Jackson, which would depart from that decision's rationale, and it was not
willing to require an invocation because such a rule would be unworkable.
125
The Court next turned to a stare decisis examination to determine if the rule from
Jackson had proven "unworkable"-a traditional ground for overturning a
decision-as well as whether, for other reasons, the decision should be
retained. 126 The Court quickly dismissed any reliance concerns regarding a
113. See id.
114. See id. at 2085-86.
115. Id. at 2085 (citing Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)).
116. Id. at 2086.
117. See id. (citing Harvey, 494 U.S. at 350).
118. Id. at 2086-87.
119. Id. at 2087.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 640 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Id. at 2091.
124. See id. at 2088.
125. See id. The Court rejected as unworkable the Louisiana Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Jackson rule, which would have required a defendant to make an express invocation of the right
to counsel. See id. at 2083-84.
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criminal defendant, reasoning that a criminal who knew of Jackson protection
would be savvy enough to work with police on his own.127 Moreover, any police
reliance on the rule would be moot because police could certainly still refrain
from initiating contact with defendants after the defendant has invoked the right
to counsel.
12 8
The Court next turned to an analysis of the reasoning undergirding the
Jackson rule. 129 Because the Jackson holding was a prophylactic rule, the Court
determined that the relevant analysis called for a weighing of the rule's benefits
against its costs. 13° In this case, the costs-society's interest in punishing
criminals-outweighed the benefits-the number of confessions suppressed
because of coercive conduct by the police. 131 The Court reasoned that the benefit
of the bright-line rule in Jackson was that it prevented any "badgering-induced
involuntary waivers" from ever being erroneously admitted at trial. 13 2 A line of
other cases, however, already provided several layers of protections designed to
prevent just such an occurrence. 133 Miranda, the first layer, protected the right
against self-incrimination by extending the right to counsel to the custodial
setting. 134 Edwards, clarifying Miranda, required police to stop interrogation
once a suspect invokes the right to counsel. 135 Finally, Minnick mandated that
police may not interrogate a defendant until counsel is present, "'whether or not
the accused has consulted with his attorney."'' 136 The Court concluded that
"[t]hese three layers of prophylaxis are sufficient" to prevent badgering.
137
The Court reasoned that the prophylaxis layers already in place would
extend to cover a suspect after his arraignment. 138 Such coverage would render
Jackson "superfluous." 139 Nor did the Court find the difference in Fifth and Sixth
Amendment contexts compelling. 14 The prior line of cases protects the right to
have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a right "guaranteed ... by
two sources of law." 141 Because any waiver must be made using the same
procedure, the doctrines protecting the voluntariness of a waiver under the Fifth
127. See id. at 2089.
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. See id. (citing Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 161 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
The Court has used a similar analysis in a line of recent cases dealing with the rights of a criminal
defendant. See infra Part IV.B.
131. Id. (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986)).
132. Id.
133. See id. at 2089-90 (citing Minnick, 498 U.S. at 153; Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,
484 (1981); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)).
134. See id. at 2089 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474).
135. See id. at 2089-90 (citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484).
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Amendment would apply to a waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as
well. 142 Thus, prior cases already served the underlying policy of Jackson, and
accordingly, the Court determined that "[t]here is no need to take Jackson's
further step of requiring voluntariness on stilts." 143 Were the Court to leave the
bright-line rule of Jackson intact in addition to the existing protections, the cost
of "'letting guilty and possibly dangerous criminals go free"' because of the
exclusionary rule would prove too high. 44 Thus, the Court overturned Michigan
v. Jackson and removed its "fourth story of prophylaxis." 145 In conclusion, the
Court quoted Justice Jackson's caveat that the "Court 'is forever adding new
stories to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of
collapsing when one story too many is added.'
146
The Court split five to four, with Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter
joining Justice Stevens's dissent. 147 Justice Stevens's dissent centered on his
differing perception of the rule in Jackson. Rather than conceiving the rule
solely as a protection against police badgering, Justice Stevens understood
Jackson to protect the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.149 He warned that the
majority "flagrantly misrepresent[ed] Jackson's underlying rationale" by
reducing it solely to an antibadgering protection. 150 The Jackson opinion, Justice
Stevens noted, did not even mention an antibadgering justification.151 Instead,
according to Justice Stevens, the opinion rested on Sixth Amendment cases
discussing the right to counsel. 152 To Justice Stevens, the creation of the
attorney-client relationship demanded "the full constitutional protection afforded
by the Sixth Amendment." 153 Thus, the Jackson rule did more than simply
prevent police badgering: it protected a defendant in any police-initiated
interrogation and assured that any waiver of counsel would be valid.
1 54
A proper focus on the Sixth Amendment context, Justice Stevens argued,
demonstrated that the majority improperly overturned Jackson.155 Though the
majority dismissed Jackson's reasoning using a cost-benefit analysis,156 Justice
142. Id. (citing Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296 (1988)).
143. Id.
144. Id. (quoting Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701 (2009)).
145. Id. at 2091-92.
146. Id. at 2092 (quoting Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 181 (1943) (Jackson, J.,
concurring in the result)).
147. See id. at 2094 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. See id. at 2096.
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. Id. Justice Stevens authored the Jackson opinion. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625,
626 (1986), overruled by Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009).
152. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2096 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Jackson, 475 U.S. at 631-32).
153. Id. at 2095.
154. Id. at 2096 n.2.
155. Id. at 2097.
156. See id. at 2089 (majority opinion) (citing Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 161
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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Stevens argued that the majority misapplied the test based on its
misunderstanding of Jackson's purpose. 157 Moreover, he argued that the Sixth
Amendment concerns constitute a much greater reliance interest that militated
against overturning Jackson.158 According to Justice Stevens, the public's
interest in knowing that counsel may be relied upon deserved greater
consideration than it received from the majority.159 Justice Stevens "remain[ed]
convinced that the warnings prescribed in Miranda, while sufficient to apprise a
defendant of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, are inadequate to
inform an unrepresented, indicted defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to
have a lawyer present at all critical stages of a criminal prosecution."
160
Justice Stevens was also not convinced that Montejo actually validly waived
his rights. He doubted that the Miranda warning was sufficient to apprise
Montejo of his right to continue to have access to counsel-a right which
Montejo must have clearly understood in order for his waiver to have been given
knowingly and voluntarily. 162 Herein lay the major difference between the
majority and the dissent. The majority assumed that the Miranda warning
provided sufficient notice to a suspect to apprise him of his right to counsel at all
stages of the proceeding, such that any waiver, even after an arraignment, would
be made knowingly. 163 Accordingly, the Court felt that adequate safeguards164
existed in the prior cases. Justice Stevens was not so sanguine and felt that the
Jackson rule was necessary to ensure that defendants knew that they had the
right to maintain a lawyer through the various stages of the process and,
subsequently, to ensure the voluntariness of the waiver. 165 For him, the Sixth
Amendment's purpose of "protec[ting] the unaided layman at critical
confrontations with his adversary" required the continued application of the rule
announced in Jackson.
16 6
III. SOUTH CAROLINA'S PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
South Carolina law provides that if a person is "financially unable to retain
counsel" but is entitled to counsel under the U.S. Constitution, then counsel must
157. See id. at 2097 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. See id. at 2098.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2100 (footnote omitted).
161. See id. at 2101.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 2090 (majority opinion) (citing Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296 (1988)).
164. See id. The Court, however, acknowledged that removing the additional layer of
protection that Jackson provided "chang[ed] the legal landscape." Id. at 2091-92. Accordingly, the
Court remanded Montejo's case so that the lower courts could determine if Montejo made his
waiver knowingly and voluntarily. Id. at 2092.
165. See id. at 2100 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 2096 (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 631 (1986)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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be provided.67 The appropriate judge must make the order to provide counsel,
but a defendant may "voluntarily and intelligently" waive this right.168 As a
result, a defendant typically makes a request,169 which means that in South
Carolina a court could easily decide whether Jackson applied.
South Carolina has incorporated the protections Jackson afforded criminal
defendants. In State v. Register,170 the South Carolina Supreme Court
distinguished between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, stating that the
Sixth Amendment right does not automatically "attach simply because the
defendant has been arrested. 1 71 Once attached, however, an invocation of the
right triggers Jackson protections, and "any waiver of the defendant's right to
counsel for that police initiated interrogation is invalid unless the defendant
initiates the contact himself.
1 72
In State v. Anderson,173 the defendant invoked his right to counsel at the
arraignment. 74 The defendant was at the scene of the shooting in question, and
as a result, police later questioned him. 75 The defendant had gone to a
restaurant, the site of the shooting, with the victim, but he did not want to admitresturat, e  oo  176
that they went there for a drug transaction. The police arrested the defendant
for the murder.1 77 The police again approached the defendant, who had invoked
his right to counsel at the arraignment, and this time he admitted the drug
arrangements.178 The prosecution later used these statements against the
defendant, but he objected, arguing that the police questioned him in violation of
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 179
The court found that this statement ran afoul of Jackson's protections. 80 The
court acknowledged that the United States Supreme Court had considered "this
very issue" in Jackson, where it "was resolved in favor of the defendant.
181
Moreover, because Jackson required the imputation of any knowledge of the
waiver from one state actor to another, the police knew or should have known
167. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-10 (2003); see also id. § 16-3-26 (requiring the appointment of
two attorneys where a defendant has been charged with murder and the prosecution will seek the
death penalty).
168. § 17-3-10.
169. See, e.g., State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 14, 515 S.E.2d 508, 514 (1999) (explaining that
counsel was appointed pursuant to appellant's request at the arraignment).
170. 323 S.C. 471, 476 S.E.2d 153 (1996).
171. See id. at 477, 476 S.E.2d at 157 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 309-10
(1966)).
172. Council, 335 S.C. at 15-16, 515 S.E.2d at 515 (citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625,
636 (1986); State v. Howard, 296 S.C. 481, 493, 374 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1988)).
173. 357 S.C. 514, 593 S.E.2d 820 (Ct. App. 2004).
174. Id. at 518, 593 S.E.2d at 822.
175. Id. at 515, 518, 593 S.E.2d at 820-22.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 518, 593 S.E.2d at 822.
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 520, 593 S.E.2d at 823.
181. Id. at 519, 593 S.E.2d at 822 (citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 634 (1986)).
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that the defendant had invoked his right to counsel and therefore should not be
approached.182 Accordingly, the court found that the officer's interrogation of the
defendant violated the protections of the Sixth Amendment and that the
statements should have been excluded from the trial.183
In a series of cases, the South Carolina Supreme Court has recognized the
rule from Jackson but found that it did not apply. In State v. Drayton,184 the court
determined that the invocation of the right to counsel must be clear, and "when a
reasonable inference may be drawn from the conduct or statements of the
accused that he does not wish to be represented by an attorney .... questioning
may be initiated., 185 As a result, the court found that when a suspect declined the
services of the public defender and made only an "ambiguous" reference to
securing private counsel at some later point, the protections of Jackson did not
apply. 186 It also has found that Jackson does not extend to cover different
offenses in different jurisdictions.
87
The South Carolina Supreme Court has also distinguished the right to
counsel in the contexts of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. In State v. George,
188
the defendant confessed after waiving his right to counsel under Miranda.18 The
confession, however, came before an indictment and occurred in a custodial190
setting, not after the initiation of judicial proceedings. Any Sixth Amendment191 192
protections, therefore, had not had attached. Similarly, in State v. Howard
the suspect confessed to FBI agents before "a State apparatus . ..had been
geared up to prosecute him."'1 93 According to the court, the Sixth Amendment
right had not attached because the suspect "had not been arraigned nor subjected
to other such similar proceedings."' 94 Moreover, the court has repeatedly
affirmed this conclusion that a confession in a custodial setting did not merit any
Sixth Amendment protections.
1 95
182. Id. (citing Jackson, 475 U.S. at 634).
183. Id. at 520, 593 S.E.2d at 823.
184. 293 S.C. 417, 361 S.E.2d 329 (1987).
185. Id. at 427, 361 S.E.2d at 335.
186. See id.
187. State v. Howard, 295 S.C. 462, 469-70, 369 S.E.2d 132, 136 (1988) (allowing South
Carolina agents to interrogate defendants who had previously retained counsel for different offenses
in North Carolina).
188. 323 S.C. 496, 476 S.E.2d 903 (1996).
189. Id. at 509, 476 S.E.2d at 911.
190. Id.; see also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428 (1986) (holding that confession in
custodial setting did not merit Sixth Amendment protection because adversarial proceedings had not
yet begun).
191. George, 323 S.C. at 509, 476 S.E.2d at 911.
192. 296 S.C. 481, 374 S.E.2d 284 (1988).
193. Id. at 494, 374 S.E.2d at 291.
194. Id. at 493-94, 374 S.E.2d at 291.
195. See State v. McCray, 332 S.C. 536, 548, 506 S.E.2d 301, 307 (1998); George, 323 S.C. at
509, 476 S.E.2d at 911.
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In State v. Council,196 the court discussed the application of Jackson's
prophylactic rule. 197 In that case, the State initiated judicial proceedings against a
defendant who had requested an attorney.198 The defendant, however, later chose
to talk to police and so indicated in a written statement. 199 The court determined
that the Sixth Amendment protections had attached but that the defendant
waived them because he, not the police, initiated the contact. 200 As a result, the
defendant "knowingly and intelligently" waived the right to counsel, and the
statement was admissible. °1
South Carolina law follows the federal constitutional law regarding waivers
as well. Though police often use express waivers, such waivers are not necessary
to establish that a defendant waived the Fifth Amendment rights to silence and
counsel. 2°2 In State v. Cope,203 the court held that when a suspect waives the
right to counsel by initiating contact with police, the accused waives the right204
under both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. In Cope, the accused argued that
a bond hearing triggered his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
2 °5
However, the court did not reach this question, finding instead that the accused
had waived any such right prior to the hearing when he waived his
"constitutional rights" after being given his Miranda warnings.206
IV. THE BEGINNING OF THE COLLAPSE?: THE IMPLICATIONS OF MONTEJO V.
LOUISIANA
A. Arguments Against the Overturning of Michigan v. Jackson
Though the reasoning in Jackson is somewhat opaque, 207 its protections
were justified. In the Sixth Amendment custodial context, the concerns about
coercion that Miranda addressed are present, but so are the additional concerns
that Justice Stevens addressed in his dissent in Montejo regarding the unaided
layman's reliance on his counsel.20 8 While greeted with disdain at first, police
196. 335 S.C. 1, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999).
197. See id. at 15-16, 515 S.E.2d at 515.
198. See id. at 14, 515 S.E.2d at 514.
199. Id. at 14, 515 S.E.2d at 515.
200. Id. at 16, 515 S.E.2d at 515.
201. Id.
202. State v. Kennedy, 333 S.C. 426, 429, 510 S.E.2d 714, 715 (1998) (citing North Carolina
v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 375-76 (1979)).
203. 385 S.C. 274, 684 S.E.2d 177 (Ct. App. 2009).
204. Id. at 292, 684 S.E.2d at 186.
205. Id. at 291, 684 S.E.2d at 186.
206. Id.
207. See The Supreme Court, 2008 Term Leading Cases, 123 HARv. L. REv. 182, 190
(2009) (acknowledging that Jackson was "ambiguous in places" and in tension with other Sixth
Amendment cases).
208. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2096 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 631 (1986)); see also Brooks Holland, A Relational Sixth
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and prosecutors both appreciated Jackson's clear rule.209 In its absence, courts
may well have to adjudicate many claims regarding a statement's voluntariness.
Jackson's bright-line rule offered many benefits and did not lead to
suppression of a large number of statements. 21  Those who supported the
retention of Jackson understood it to extend beyond the prevention of police
badgering.1 Jackson, they suggested, protected the "critical role the attorney
plays in protecting the defendant's interests," 212 providing a "medium" between
213the defendant and the State. Based on the existing line of cases, they argued
214that the Sixth Amendment prohibits all police-initiated interrogation. This
broader understanding of the rule in Jackson squares with Justice Stevens's
analysis in his dissent in Montejo.
2 15
Many law-enforcement officers and prosecutors also favored the retention of
the bright-line rule in Jackson.216 They argued that Jackson "provid[ed] an easily
enforceable rule" whose "simplicity and clarity" aided police officers both in
2 17 218training and in practice. Removing such an "embedded '  rule would force
judges and police officers alike to suffer through the development of a new
common law in that area.219 In operation, a bright-line rule such as Jackson's
proves "inherently more workable" than waiting for a judge's after-the-fact
220determination regarding police actions. Prosecutors can proceed more
confidently because they can easily determine if a police investigation was
221proper. Moreover, only rarely would a guilty defendant go free because of the
application of the rule.
Amendment During Interrogation, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMrNOLOGY 381, 384 (2009) ("Perhaps in no
[other] pretrial context can this advice of counsel matter more than during an interrogation.").
209. See Supplemental Brief of Amici Curiae Larry D. Thompson, William Sessions et al., in
Support of Petitioner at 3, Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (No. 07-1529).
210. Only one such case can be found in South Carolina's published cases. See State v.
Anderson, 357 S.C. 514, 520, 593 S.E.2d 820, 823 (Ct. App. 2004).
211. See Brief for the National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 27, Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (No. 07-1529).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 25 (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Holland, supra note 208, at 425 ("[T]he Court should frame constitutional rules
around the premise of the constitutional guarantee: that the State must 'honor' the attorney-client
relationship .... ").
214. See Brief for the National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al., supra note 211, at
25.
215. See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2096 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
216. See Supplemental Brief of Amici Curiae Larry D. Thompson, William Sessions et al.,
supra note 209, at 5-6.
217. Id. at 3.
218. Id. at 4 (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
219. Id. at 3.
220. Id. at 6.
221. Id. at 16.
222. Id. at 6.
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None of these arguments, however, swayed the Court in Montejo, and it
overruled Jackson.223 By the time Montejo's case reached the Supreme Court,
the Court had moved to a narrower understanding of Jackson and similar cases.
The Court identified Jackson's purpose as solely to prevent police badgering.
224
With this understanding, the Court found it much easier to overturn the case. The
antibadgering rationale weighed much less on the balancing scale the Court
employed than a rule understood to protect the relationship between the
uninformed suspect and his hopefully knowledgeable counsel, and the scales
tipped in favor of rejecting the rule.225
B. Constitutional Principles and the Supreme Court's Balancing Approach
The Court has used a similar approach in other cases to rein in the
protections afforded to criminal defendants. As shown in Montejo, the Court first
identifies the underlying rationale of the precedent, typically in a narrow
fashion.226 Then the Court conducts a balancing test to determine if a given rule
227 228furthers this purpose. For example, in Herring v. United States, the Court
identified the purpose of the exclusionary rule as deterring wrongful police
conduct. 229 The Court then used a balancing test-weighing the possible
deterrent effect against the social cost of letting a criminal go free-to determine
if the rule should apply where police had negligently used an invalid warrant.
23 °
In this case, the police culpability was low, and enforcing the exclusionary rule,
the Court reasoned, would not likely have a large deterrent effect in similar
situations in the future.231
Justice Ginsburg dissented and would have applied the exclusionary rule and
would not, as the majority did, "so constrict" the exclusionary rule.232 She
maintained "a more majestic conception" of the rule as preserving the respect
and dignity of the judicial system as a whole.233 Understood this way,
enforcement of the rule would be necessary even where its deterrent effect was
de minimis because of the implications for the judicial system in using such
223. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091 (2009).
224. See id. at 2086.
225. See id. at 2089-91.
226. See id. at 2086.
227. See id. at 2089-91.
228. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009).
229. See id. at 700.
230. See id. at 700-01.
231. See id. at 701-02.
232. Id. at 705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 707 (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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evidence. 234 This analysis is akin to Stevens's dissent in Montejo, where he
offered a more fundamental purpose for the Jackson rule.
235
Similarly, in Hudson v. Michigan236 the Court held that the exclusionary rule
did not apply where officers violated the knock-and-announce rule.237 The Court
found that the rule protected human life and limb, property, privacy, and
dignity. 238  The rule did not protect against the unwanted discovery of
evidence. Thus, application of the rule in this situation would not further the240
purpose of the rule. In his dissent, Justice Breyer pointed out that the practical
effect of this ruling enabled the police to "ignore the Constitution's
requirements."
241
In one respect, these cases-Herring, Hudson, and Montejo-appear to
undermine the amendments they seek to protect by constricting a particular
protection. The Court, however, views protections such as the exclusionary rule,
the knock-and-announce rule, and the prophylactic rules announced in Edwards
and Jackson as just that-rules.242 These rules are judicially created means to
protect the underlying amendments. As Justice Jackson warned, when such rules
become overextended, they are susceptible to collapse. 243 The current Court
seems more than willing to push back on the layers of protection that have built
up over the years where it feels the rules no longer serve their underlying
purpose.
If one understands these amendments to protect core principles, then the
rules-based approach used in these cases threatens to undermine the strength of
these amendments. Those who argue that the Constitution protects core
principles understand the amendments to protect "abstract moral principles.
' 244
Courts should interpret cases involving these principles in light of "past legal and
political practice."2 45 Thus, constitutional law could be understood to develop in
a common law fashion where precedent forms a "common ground"-a
234. Id.
235. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2096 (2009).
236. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).




241. Id. at 609 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
242. The Court has expressly held that Miranda is constitutionally mandated and not a
judicially created prophylactic rule that Congress could overrule. See Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000). See generally Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda,
112 YALE L.J. 447, 450 (2002) ("Miranda is best understood as a constitutional rule of
admissibility."); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 190, 190
(1988) ("'[P]rophylactic' rules are not exceptional measures of questionable legitimacy but are a
central and necessary feature of constitutional law.").
243. See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 181 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring in the
result).
244. RONALD DwORKN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 7 (1996).
245. Id. at 9.
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consensus on major issues-that is "readily accepted ...among people who
otherwise disagree. 246
A hard case, such as Montejo, becomes a "pivotal case[] testing fundamental
principles, not a[] borderline case[] calling for some more or less arbitrary
line." A court should interpret a case such as Montejo in light of these past
decisions that have identified and upheld the principle of protecting the criminal
defendant by conferring, among other protections, the right to the assistance of
counsel. The case should be considered within the "seamless web, 248 of cases
that have developed around this core principle. So considered, Montejo would be
yet another case where a court must consider the interaction between the police
and the unaided laymen. Rather than asking the narrow question about the rules'
benefits vis-d-vis their costs, as the Court did,249 the Court should have
considered the case against the backdrop of constitutional cases that have
protected a defendant in such a situation.
Montejo falls into this line of cases with major implications for criminal
defendants. The Court in Montejo worried that the protections afforded to
defendants had become overextended, 25 and it trimmed them back. In the
process, however, it weakened one of the major principles of the criminal justice
system -a defendant's right to counsel.
C. The Current Status of the Law
The opinion in Montejo leaves this area of the law in some confusion.
Clearly, after Montejo, a suspect who has been arraigned no longer has Jackson's
added protection from police-initiated contact. The ruling in Montejo, however,
leaves the defendant in a rather odd position and would allow the police, in some
situations, to approach the defendant. The situation will vary depending upon
whether the suspect remains in custody and whether the suspect has waived his
Miranda rights.
If a suspect remains in custody and has not waived his Miranda rights, the
Fifth Amendment right to counsel may still protect the suspect. The protections
would apply, even after arraignment, so long as the defendant remained in
custody. The Court acknowledged this protection when it remanded Montejo
for a determination of whether Montejo had validly waived his Edwards right.
21
2
Thus, a defendant who has been arraigned or indicted and who is facing judicial
246. David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle, 112 YALE
L.J. 1717, 1725 (2003).
247. RONALD DWORKiN, LAW'S EMPiRE 43 (1986).
248. RONALD DWORKiN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 115 (1977).
249. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2089-91 (2009).
250. See id. at 2090.
251. But see Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1223 (2010) (addressing the issue of the
extent of Edwards and establishing a fourteen-day limitation).
252. See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2092.
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proceedings as understood by the Sixth Amendment would have to look to the
Fifth Amendment, at least in these circumstances, for protection.
The extent of this protection, however, remains unclear, and the Supreme
Court may grant certiorari on a case to clarify this increasingly complex area of
law. As clarified in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 253 the protections under Jackson were
offense specific, 254 while the Miranda-Edwards protections were not.255 Would
the more robust protection of the Miranda line of cases now protect a defendant
rather than the crime-specific protections that existed prior to Montejo? Would
McNeil still apply, or is it no longer viable because the Court overturned
Jackson?256 In other words, the Court should delineate the precise contours-
whether the protections are offense specific or cover all crimes--of Miranda-
Edwards as applied in the Sixth Amendment context.
If the defendant is released from custody, the Miranda-Edwards line of
cases would not apply. 257 Jackson would have prevented police-initiated
interrogation in this context, but in Montejo, the Court dismissed concerns in this
area because it is the "least likely to pose a risk of coerced waivers." 258 The
Court reasoned that the defendant in such a situation is in "control" and could
simply "shut his door or walk away to avoid police badgering., 259 But the police
260could, according to Montejo, approach a defendant in just such a situation.
Presumably, if police officers obtain a statement from a defendant, they must
garner the statement voluntarily for it to be admissible.26 1 The opinion did not
elaborate in this area and leaves several questions. How would the police ensure
that a criminal defendant's statement obtained in such a situation is voluntary?
Would the police need to provide a warning (not necessarily Miranda) of some
type? Would the prosecution have to litigate such a situation under the old
voluntariness standard?
If the suspect has waived his Miranda rights, he has only the protection of
counsel afforded by the Sixth Amendment. Police may approach the defendant to
253. 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
254. Id. at 175.
255. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682 (1988) (noting that Miranda's protections
extend to all crimes, not just the crime for which a suspect has been arrested or detained).
256. One court that has treated this issue since Montejo still followed McNeil and allowed the
introduction of statements regarding a second crime where the defendant had invoked his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel but had waived his Miranda rights. See Flores v. State, 299 S.W.3d
843, 852-53 (Tex. App. 2009) (refusing to allow an invocation of the Sixth Amendment offense-
specific right to counsel to constitute an invocation of the Fifth Amendment right that protects a
suspect during interrogation).




261. Because any such statement would constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, it would
have to be voluntary to be valid. See supra Part B.C.
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ask him if he would like to speak with them.262 Post-Montejo, this dictates that
police officers need demonstrate only that a waiver was made voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently in order for that statement to be admissible. 263 In
this respect, the situation would be similar to a case where the defendant has
invoked Miranda but has been released from custody. A problem could arise,
however, where the defendant waives Miranda and is then arraigned and
provided with counsel. If police initiate contact with the accused at some later
time, the defendant may likely be relying on his counsel once again, and he may
not fully comprehend the ramifications of any ensuing conversation.
Interrogation in these circumstances may implicate similar concerns to Miranda
regarding coercion, but it also raises new concerns stemming from the suspect's
reliance on his counsel.
The facts of Hughen v. State26 4 demonstrate the confusion in this area of law
after Montejo. The defendant was involved in a "violent altercation" that led to
265police investigation. The police arrested and then arraigned the defendant, at
266which point he requested counsel. Only three hours later, and before counsel
arrived, the police initiated an interview with the defendant.267 The police read
him his Miranda rights and then asked him if he understood them and if he
268would like to have a lawyer present. The police gave the defendant a waiver
form, which he initialed, but he asked, "This ain't waiving my right for an
attorney, is it? '269 The police responded that it was not waiving that right and
that they would be talking about only what had happened during the
altercation. 27  The defendant subsequently answered questions about the
altercation that the prosecution later used against him.271 The defendant appealed
on the grounds that the police violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.272
The Texas appellate court found that the Sixth Amendment right had indeed
attached because the State had begun "adversarial judicial proceedings against
him., 273 The defendant argued that Jackson prevented such police-initiated
interrogations, but the court addressed the case after Montejo and found the
defendant's argument based on Jackson without merit.274 Thus, the court
262. In this scenario, the defendant should not be surprised to be approached by police
because the defendant has already waived his Miranda rights. Practically, however, police may be
reluctant to approach such a defendant because he has obtained counsel. It remains to be seen
whether police officers will exploit a defendant in such a situation.
263. See supra Part II.C.
264. 297 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
265. Id. at 331.
266. Id. at 331-32.
267. Id. at 332.
268. Id.
269. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 332-33.
272. Id. at 333.
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affirmed the judgment of the lower court because "the Sixth Amendment does
not bar police-initiated interrogation of an accused who has previously asserted
his right to counsel.,
275
The Hughen court's interpretation of Montejo, however, leaves a defendant
with a vitiated Sixth Amendment right-and little protection. Justice Scalia
276argued that the Court should overturn Jackson because it was redundant. But
unless the defendant's invocation of the right to counsel at the arraignment
constitutes an invocation of the right under both amendments, the defendant will
be subject to exactly the kind of coercion that Edwards and Miranda sought to
avoid. Instead of getting two layers of protection, as Justice Scalia reasoned, the
defendant would receive neither. For example, if a defendant waived his
Miranda rights and was later arraigned, he would not have a chance to reinvoke
the Miranda right until police read him those rights again. Practically, this means
that the police could get at least one chance to approach a defendant after he has
secured counsel. This scenario, as Hughen demonstrates, enables police to
sidestep Edwards.
In Hughen, the defendant's invocation of the right to counsel should have
triggered the right under both amendments, and most importantly, it should have
triggered Edwards's protection.277 The Texas court's interpretation makes the
Sixth Amendment right dependent upon the Miranda warning. In other words, it
prevents an invocation of the right to counsel unless and until a suspect is read
his Miranda warning. Such an interpretation leaves the Sixth Amendment with
little force against police-initiated interrogation. In this scenario, the defendant
invoked the right to counsel at the arraignment, and as a result, any statements
stemming from the subsequent police-initiated interrogation should not have
been admissible. Otherwise, the Court's assertion in Montejo that "sufficient"
protections exist outside Jackson to protect a defendant offers little substance.
278
The Hughen court's interpretation of Montejo severely weakens the
constitutional right to counsel. The police officers in Hughen eluded not only his
request for counsel but also the holding of Edwards when they waited until after
arraignment to initiate their interview. The Texas court's holding creates a
275. Id.
276. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2090 (2009).
277. The Court has held that "[t]o invoke the Sixth Amendment interest is, as a matter of fact,
not to invoke the Miranda-Edwards interest." McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991). In
McNeil, however, the issue turned on whether a defendant could use an invocation of the Sixth
Amendment to prevent the introduction of statements regarding a different crime than the one for
which he invoked the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 174-75. The Court did not address
the issue of whether an invocation of the Sixth Amendment right should trigger the Miranda-
Edwards protections regarding the same offense. The Court did not need to consider this scenario
because Jackson clearly governed such a scenario. See id at 175 (acknowledging that Jackson's
protections, including the "invalidat[ion of] subsequent waivers in police-initiated interviews," were
offense specific). Because Montejo overturned Jackson, it no longer provides clear guidance in such
a situation. McNeil, however, does not, nor should it, govern such a scenario.
278. See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090.
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loophole that police may exploit at the defendant's expense. If one understands
the invocation of the right to counsel to trigger the protection of both
amendments, however, this loophole would be avoided. Moreover, such an
interpretation would square with the majority's assertion in Montejo that
adequate protections exist to protect a defendant.
D. Continuing Developments
The Supreme Court recently released its decision on another case with
implications for the right to counsel-Maryland v. Shatzer.279 The case required
the Supreme Court to determine "whether a break in custody ends the
presumption of involuntariness established in Edwards. ''2s° In Shatzer, the police
received reports in August 2003 concerning sexual abuse regarding an inmate
stemming from events before his incarceration. 281 Police officers attempted to
question him, but he did not want to talk without an attorney.282 In March 2006,
the police conducted a follow-up investigation and sent another detective to
283question the defendant. This time, the defendant, though initially surprised to
find that the investigation was ongoing, waived his Miranda rights and
eventually made incriminating statements.
284
The Attorney General of Maryland argued that this case required the same
283balancing test of the rule's costs and benefits used in Montejo. The proposed
indefinite extension of Edwards, propounded by Shatzer, would prove
impractical and would require police to keep track of "every suspect who has
ever asserted his Fifth Amendment right to counsel., 286 The rule in Edwards, the
attorney general argued, was an "antibadgering provision."287 In its amicus brief,
the United States also focused on this underlying rationale of the Miranda-
288Edwards line of cases. The United States argued that such a purpose would
not be furthered in this situation because there was a break in custody.289 This
break, it argued, should terminate the Edwards presumption. 29 Here, the break
occurred when the State placed the defendant back into the general prison
279. 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010).
280. Id. at 1217 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)).
281. See id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1217-18.
284. See id. at 1218.
285. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Shatter, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010) (No. 08-680) (citing
Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2089 (2009)).
286. Id. at 2.
287. Id. at 4.
288. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7-11, Shatzer, 130
S. Ct. 1213 (2010) (No. 08-680).
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population. 291 Though the defendant was still in custody, he was not subject to
the same coercive pressures identified in Miranda.292
The Court determined that a break in custody terminates Edwards's
presumption, and that such a break occurs after fourteen days.293 The Court went
on to hold that incarceration does not constitute Miranda custody and that
release into a general population constitutes a break in custody.294 The Court
determined that the Edwards rule existed to prevent police from applying
"continu[ing] pressure" to coerce a suspect into confessing.295 The Court
reasoned that this risk is diminished where a suspect has "returned to his normal
life for some time." 296 At this point, the Court surmised, a suspect would not be
isolated, could seek advice from others, and would know that investigative
custody is not indefinite. 297 As a result, the Court established a fourteen-day
limitation, concluding that length "provides plenty of time for the suspect to get
reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to shake
off any residual coercive effects of his prior custody. 298
The Court analyzed Shatzer using the same cost-benefit balancing test used299
in Herring, Hudson, and Montejo. The Court determined that because
Edwards was a judicially prescribed prophylaxis, it would "appl[y] only where
its benefits outweigh its costs. ' '3° ° In this case, the passage of time meant that
"extending the Edwards rule yields diminished benefits."30 1 The Court
concluded that after fourteen days, such a waiver is the "most unlikely to be
compelled" and application of the rule would run the risk of excluding valid
confessions. 30 2 The Court concluded that at that point suspects would have
"regain[ed] the degree of control they had over their lives prior to the
interrogation.,
30 3
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, agreeing that in this
circumstance-a two-and-a-half year delay-Edwards's protections did not
apply. 30 4 He however, did not agree with the Court's fourteen day break-in-
custody rule, which he deemed to be founded on "speculation." 3°5 For Justice
Stevens, the core concern remained the individual who had been promised a
291. Id. at 18.
292. Id.
293. Shatter, 130 S. Ct. at 1223.
294. Id. at 1224.
295. Id. at 1220.
296. Id. at 1221.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1223.
299. See id. at 1220.
300. Id. (citing Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2089 (2009)).
301. Id. at 1221.
302. Id. at 1223.
303. Id. at 1224.
304. See id. at 1234 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
305. Id. at 1231.
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lawyer but had not yet received one. 306 Even a fourteen-day delay, he reasoned,
would not mitigate the effect on such an individual who has not yet received the
counsel he requested.3 °7 Such a suspect would likely "feel that the police lied to
him and that he really does not have any right to a lawyer."
308
After Montejo, some defendants who have obtained counsel may have to
rely on Edwards's protections. In Montejo, the Court reasoned that Edwards
already protected a defendant to the extent that a similar rule in the Sixth
Amendment context was not needed.3 °9 Shatzer curtails the extent to which
Edwards would offer protection. In his concurrence in Shatzer, Justice Stevens
asked, "How then, under the Court's decision today, will Edwards serve the role
that the Court placed on it in Monteo?"310 Justice Stevens's statement indicates
that the ruling in Shatzer has implications beyond those addressed by the
majority and could produce another loophole for police to exploit after
Montejo.311
The current trajectory of the law in this area also portends a collapse of
many of the protections that a defendant once enjoyed. Though the Court in
Montejo acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment's protections were not in
312 313dispute, the Court has begun to trim back those protections. Montejo,
coupled with Shatzer, represents a step in the direction of removing protections
for the defendant. The temple is indeed collapsing.
V. THE EFFECT OF MONTEJO V. LOUISIANA ON SOUTH CAROLINA
South Carolina provides a clear example of why the Court in Montejo was
too quick to overturn Jackson. South Carolina courts have consistently
maintained an analysis of the right to counsel that was mindful of the differences
314between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment contexts. South Carolina courts,
306. See id.
307. See id. at 1234 n.15.
308. Id. at 1229.
309. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2090-92 (2009).
310. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. at 1233 n.14 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
311. See id. at 1231 n.10 (suggesting that the majority's "rule creates a strange incentive to
delay formal proceedings").
312. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2085.
313. See generally Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an
Endangered Right?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 35, 36-37 (1991) ("With a few notable exceptions, the
Supreme Court's recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has been marked by doctrinal
inconsistency and by the Court's failure to adhere to the core values embedded in the amendment."
(footnote omitted)); Holland, supra note 208, at 386 (arguing that the current Supreme Court's
right-to-counsel jurisprudence fails to "recognize and protect the necessary professional relationship
that attorney and client share in a criminal case"); The Supreme Court, 2008 Term Leading Cases,
supra note 207, at 192 ("The Court should not be less attuned to the objects of concern under the
Sixth Amendment than those under the Fifth Amendment, especially when the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel is in the text of the Constitution.").
314. See supra Part I1.
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however, have followed the federal constitutional guidelines.315 South Carolina
decisions regarding the right to counsel follow the Supreme Court decisions
interpreting these rights in both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment contexts.
316
Typically, a South Carolina case will cite both the Supreme Court case on point
317and a similar South Carolina case. South Carolina may, of course, grant a
higher degree of protection than the floor mandated by the Supreme Court.3 18
Given its reliance on the United States Supreme Court in this area, the court may
be unlikely to do so in this situation. Additionally, the South Carolina
Constitution does not have a clause that affords a criminal defendant the right to
have an attorney.319
Absent a change in its typical course, South Carolina law will continue to
parallel the federal law in this area. Following the federal law in this area,
however, will prove challenging because the law is in a state of flux. A South
Carolina court could very well be greeted with a case that falls into one of the
gray areas left in the right-to-counsel jurisprudence after Montejo. Such a court
would be left with little direction and would have to address the question absent
guidance from the Supreme Court as to the status of the federal law. Such a court
should be mindful of the implications of such a decision. Because the right to
counsel stems from two sources, two different sets of concerns are implicated.
Not only should a court consider the possibility of police badgering, but a court
should also acknowledge that a defendant may be relying on his counsel once the
adversarial process has begun. Given the complexity and fluidity of the law in
this area, this concern is paramount.
The case of State v. Anderson provides some support for a defendant.
320
Moreover, Anderson demonstrates that the Supreme Court's previous cases
established guidelines that South Carolina courts could easily follow. Because
South Carolina courts have not had difficulty determining whether a suspect has
315. See State v. Owens, 346 S.C. 637, 661, 552 S.E.2d 745, 758 (2001) (stating that "South
Carolina follows the federal constitutional rule" regarding the Sixth Amendment), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 105-06, 610 S.E.2d 494, 501 (2005).
316. See, e.g., State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 15, 515 S.E.2d 508, 515 (1999) (citing both United
States Supreme Court and South Carolina cases interpreting Fifth and Sixth Amendment decisions).
317. See, e.g., State v. Grizzle, 293 S.C. 19, 20-21, 358 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1987) (citing
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); State v. Koon, 278 S.C. 528, 298 S.E.2d 769 (1982))
(citing both a United States Supreme Court case and a South Carolina Supreme Court case for the
proposition from Edwards that police may not initiate contact after a suspect invokes Miranda).
318. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181-82 (1991) (rejecting a bright-line rule
proffered by the petitioner barring any police-initiated questioning of a suspect in custody and,
instead, noting that police are "free, if they wish, to adopt it on their own"); Ross v. Moffitt, 417
U.S. 600, 618 (1974) (holding that the Constitution did not require states to provide counsel for
indigent defendants in discretionary appeals but also stating that the court did not want to
"discourage" those states that did make counsel available at all stages ofjudicial review).
319. See S.C. CONST. art. I §§ 1-24 (providing a list of the declaration of rights).
320. See State v. Anderson, 357 S.C. 514, 519-20, 593 S.E.2d 820, 822-23 (Ct. App. 2004)
(applying the Jackson rule and excluding a statement made by a defendant in a police-initiated
interview).
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invoked the right to counsel, 321 Jackson could be applied without difficulty.
Montejo needlessly complicates this area of the law, and South Carolina need not
follow the path of the Supreme Court. Unfortunately, Anderson relied upon the
now overruled Michigan v. Jackson.322 Other South Carolina cases discussing
Jackson's protections also rely solely on Jackson.
3 23
South Carolina should nevertheless refuse to deviate from Anderson.
Anderson could be understood as a common law case standing for the
proposition that, in South Carolina, a statement made in a police-initiated
interview by a defendant who has been arraigned is not made voluntarily. South
Carolina criminal law recognizes the continued vitality of the common law.324 In
this tradition, case law builds upon earlier rulings that have identified principles,
and Anderson could be cited to represent South Carolina's recognition of the
principle undergirding the decision in Jackson.
Anderson fits within South Carolina's common law in a number of ways.
First, South Carolina law has long held that admissions must be voluntary in
order to be admissible.325 When faced with a set of facts similar to either
Montejo or Anderson, an attorney should argue that South Carolina already has a
case on point standing for the proposition that statements made to police when
police initiate the interrogation of a defendant who has invoked his right to
counsel are not made voluntarily. As a result, such a situation need not be
relitigated.
Second, prior to Miranda, South Carolina law recognized the dangers
inherent in a custodial interrogation. Though the court refused to adopt a per se
326rule that a custodial confession is inadmissible, it has held that, in such a
situation, the officer's conduct will be "rigidly scrutinized., 327 In Anderson, the
court determined that initiating an interview with a represented defendant was328
inappropriate conduct by the officer. Though the court interpreted the case
321. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
322. See Anderson, 357 S.C. at 518-19, 593 S.E.2d at 822.
323. See, e.g., State v. McCray, 332 S.C. 536, 548, 506 S.E.2d 301, 307 (1998) (citing
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986)) (discussing protections outlined in Jackson); State v.
Drayton, 293 S.C. 417, 427, 361 S.E.2d 329, 335 (1987) (citing Jackson, 475 U.S. 625) (same).
324. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-1-50 (1976); see also State v. Carson, 274 S.C. 316, 318, 262
S.E.2d 918, 919-20 (1980) (citing § 14-1-50) (recognizing the crime of misprision of a felony
despite the fact that the law had long been dormant); State v. Nail, 304 S.C. 332, 337-39, 404
S.E.2d 202, 206-07 (Ct. App. 1991) (relying upon English common law to recognize citizen's
arrest).
325. See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 69 S.C. 72, 76, 48 S.E. 35, 36 (1904) (holding that to admit
statements that had been procured by duress would be "shocking to all sense of justice"); State v.
Workman, 15 S.C. 540, 544 (1881) (citing 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 219 (Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1860)) (discussing the necessity that confessions
must have been "free and voluntary" and not have been "extracted by fear or induced by hope").
326. See State v. Brown, 212 S.C. 237, 246, 47 S.E.2d 521, 525 (1948) (citing State v. Judge,
208 S.C. 497, 503, 38 S.E.2d 715, 718 (1946)).
327. Brown, 212 S.C. at 246, 47 S.E.2d at 525 (quoting State v. Henderson, 74 S.C. 477, 478,
55 S.E. 117, 118 (1906)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
328. See State v. Anderson, 357 S.C. 514, 520, 593 S.E.2d 820, 823 (Ct. App. 2004).
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329using the rule from Jackson, Anderson could be understood as an application
of this older test in a more recent case.
Finally, South Carolina law provides more general statements that one
arguing for the continued vitality of Anderson could rely upon. In State v.
Corn, 33 the court concluded that "before the life of another on account thereof is
forfeited, such one should be convicted only on testimony that leaves no
reasonable doubt as to his guilt, and entirely free of influences not properly a
part of the trial., 331 Again, Anderson could be understood to demonstrate that
when police officers initiate an interview with a represented defendant, they
improperly influence the defendant.
In each of these cases, however, the courts deemed that these situations
called for a case-by-case analysis.332 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court rejected
a bright-line rule when it overturned Jackson.33 3 Because that case offered easy-
to-follow guidelines, Anderson could now remain valid in South Carolina and
stand for such a bright-line rule. If faced with a similar factual scenario, courts
could hold that Anderson governs and refuse to allow the issue to be relitigated.
Accordingly, South Carolina could, in the common law tradition, retain the
protections of Jackson as embodied in Anderson.
Moreover, understanding Anderson in this manner also squares with the idea
that the law protects core principles. South Carolina has already identified and
protected the principle that the criminal defendant should be protected in a
custodial situation. Additionally, South Carolina has protected the criminal
defendant's right to counsel.335 Anderson implicates both of these core principles
already enshrined in South Carolina law. By retaining the holding of Anderson,
South Carolina would protect its criminal defendants from undue coercion,
provide police officers with a clearly established line, and continue to protect the
core principles supporting the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
VI. CONCLUSION
The law in this area has become increasingly complex, and Montejo did little
to restore clarity to the area. A suspect in custody facing judicial proceedings-a
context traditionally understood to fall within the Sixth Amendment's
protections-must now rely on the Fifth Amendment protections outlined in
336 337Miranda and Edwards. Though Jackson was not without its problems, it did
329. See id. at 519, 593 S.E.2d at 822.
330. 215 S.C. 166, 54 S.E.2d 559 (1949).
331. Id. at 174, 54 S.E.2d at 562.
332. See, e.g., State v. Workman, 15 S.C. 540, 544 (1881) (citing GREENLEAF, supra note
325, § 219) (providing that each case must "depend upon its own circumstances").
333. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091-92 (2009).
334. See supra Part III.
335. See supra Part III.
336. If a suspect is not in custody, he receives no protection except for his own discretion as to
whether to talk to police.
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provide protections that squared with the context. In Montejo, the Court
overturned Jackson because it believed Jackson improperly extended a Fifth
Amendment rule into a Sixth Amendment context, but the result is that a
defendant in a Sixth Amendment context must now rely on Fifth Amendment
protections. Because the Court relied on these Fifth Amendment protections in
Montejo, it left many questions unanswered as to their application in a Sixth
Amendment context.
Retaining the rule from Anderson-the South Carolina case that adopts the
rule in Jackson-in a common law fashion relieves South Carolina courts from
the requirement of developing a new body of case law to fill in the gaps after
Montejo. Because the adversarial process often begins while a defendant is still
in custody and is still being interrogated, such a rule protects against the coercion
that Miranda found inherent in such custodial interrogations. As a result, such a
rule would provide protection regardless of whether Edwards provided
protection.339 Anderson forbids police-initiated interrogation or questioning of
defendants who have invoked the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and allays
the concerns inherent in such interrogations. Moreover, it protects the attorney-
client relationship and acknowledges the defendant's reliance upon his attorney.
In addition to protecting a defendant's rights, it also provides both police and
prosecutors with a clear line. Accordingly, South Carolina should refuse to
reconsider the extent of its right-to-counsel jurisprudence and should retain
Anderson's holding and protect long-standing, core principles of South Carolina
law. The temple need not collapse.
Adam J Hegler
337. For example, Jackson's requirement that a suspect must invoke the right to counsel led
directly to the problem in Montejo. See supra Part II.D.
338. See supra Part I.C.
339. In light of the recent decision in Maryland v. Shatzer, a suspect cannot indefinitely rely
on Edwards to prevent reinterrogation. See supra notes 293-94 and accompanying text.
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